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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge. 
 
Ethel Burnett ("Burnett"), asserting error in the denial of 
her application for social security disability insurance 
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 
42 U.S.C. SS 401-433, has appealed the District Court's 
order affirming the final decision of appellee, Commissioner 
of Social Security ("Commissioner"), to deny Burnett's claim 
for disability benefits. The District Court exercised 
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. S 405(g), and this Court has 
jurisdiction over Burnett's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the 
District Court's order affirming the Commissioner's decision 
and remand the case with instructions to return it to the 
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. Background 
 
Burnett, born January 6, 1935, has a 10th grade 
education and worked in supermarket meat and 
delicatessen departments from 1977 to 1991. She injured 
her right knee and lower back in a slip and fall accident at 
work in December 1989. Burnett maintains her back and 
knee injuries have rendered her totally unable to work 
since May 18, 1991. 
 
A. Medical History 
 
Burnett was first seen for her knee injury in January, 
1990 by Dr. Charles Makowski, who placed her on a 
conservative treatment regime and referred her to Dr. 
Richard Surgent. Dr. Surgent observed minor swelling, 
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tenderness of the patella, and muscle weakness in her knee 
and that she walked with an antalgic gait, favoring her 
right side. Dr. Surgent ordered an x-ray of the knee, which 
showed slight narrowing of the medial compartment and 
joint effusion. He diagnosed her with chondromalacia and 
prescribed pain killers and physical therapy. 
 
Burnett received physical therapy through Pinelands 
Physical Therapy from January 1990 through March 1990. 
In March, 1990 the physical therapist's discharge summary 
indicated that Burnett had "progressed well" and had 
returned to work. Dr. Surgent's notes regarding a March 
27, 1990 visit indicated Burnett still had some tenderness 
and grating sensation in the right knee but concluded she 
had reached a plateau with regard to further treatment. 
 
In the summer of 1991, Burnett twice visited Dr. 
Makowski, complaining of back pain. MRI scans of her 
lower back performed for Dr. Makowski indicatedfirst 
degree spondylolisthesis of the lumbar spine (slight forward 
displacement of L5 over S1) but no significant spinal 
stenosis. An X-ray of Burnett's knee showed joint effusion 
and a narrowed medial compartment. Dr. Makowski again 
referred Burnett to Dr. Surgent, although she apparently 
did not see him. Dr. Makowski prescribed pain killers and 
physical therapy. 
 
Burnett returned to Pinelands for sixteen physical 
therapy sessions on her knee during July and August 
1991. The therapist's notes indicated that Burnett declined 
treatment for her lower back and that, on release, Burnett's 
range of motion in her right knee had increased and her 
knee strength had increased from fair to good. 
 
Burnett was seen by Dr. Roy Mittman in January 1992, 
complaining of knee and back pain and that her knee gives 
out during standing. Dr. Mittman observed no medial or 
lateral joint line tenderness and no gross instability in the 
knee. He also noted some discomfort, some patellofemoral 
grinding, and a 1/4 inch atrophy in her right quadricep. He 
gave Burnett an injection for pain. At a follow-up visit in 
February, Dr. Mittman concluded Burnett did not have a 
significant problem with her knee and that she could return 
to work, noting, however, he was not authorized to deal 
with Burnett's back problems. 
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In April 1992, Dr. Alfred Hess conducted a consultive 
orthopedic examination of Burnett for the Social Security 
Administration ("SSA"). He observed no joint inflammation, 
crepitus, or pain on palpation of extremities; normal 
strength and range of motion in the knee; a small cyst in 
the right knee; no muscle atrophy; normal gait with no 
significant antalgia or ataxia and no need for assistive 
device. He noted a swelling on the coccyx, and concluded it 
was probably a benign bone tumor. He did not order x-rays 
or an MRI and did not review her earlier films. Dr. Hess 
concluded Burnett could lift and carry up to 20 pounds and 
could "sit and stand intermittently during an eight hour 
day." R. 163.1 
 
In March 1993, Dr. Herbert Knapp saw Burnett and 
observed she had a broad-based gait, that she favored her 
right leg slightly, and could not assume even a partial 
squat. He noted "full extension and [loss of] about 60 
degrees of flexion of the right knee complaining of pain in 
the right patella when flexing." R. 167. Dr. Knapp noted a 
palpable muscle spasm of the paravertebral lumbar 
musculature associated with tenderness running from S1 
to L4 and tenderness in lumbosacral joint. He diagnosed 
her with bilateral paravertebral lumbar myositis, 
lumbosacral sprain, and right knee sprain. Dr. Knapp 
found Burnett's flexion and extension in her back to be 
somewhat less than the normal range of motion. He 
concluded Burnett was "permanently disabled 
orthopaedically to the extent of 30% of the total," with no 
improvement expected. Id. 
 
Burnett was next seen in 1993 by Dr. Steven Berkowitz. 
His examination revealed "a mild limp on the right, 
tenderness over sacrum and coccyx posteriorly with a 
limited range of motion, [and] an equivocal straight leg test 
on the right." R. 169. He also noted no neurological deficits. 
Based on review of Burnett's earlier computerized 
tomography ("CT") scan and MRI, Dr. Berkowitz diagnosed 
her with a degenerative disk at the L5-S1 level with 
hyperlordosis of the lumbar spine, but noted there was no 
evidence of spinal stenosis or nerve root entrapment. He 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Administrative Record is referred to as"R. ___." 
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prescribed non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication and 
concluded there was no need for surgery. 
 
Finally, Burnett's file was reviewed by Dr. Atienza, a 
physician for the state of New Jersey, who completed a 
disability determination and transmittal form on January 
29, 1994. Based solely on her records, he concluded 
Burnett could frequently lift 25 pounds and occasionally lift 
50 pounds, could stand/walk for 6 out of 8 hours per day, 
could sit for 6 out of 8 hours per day, had no limitations on 
pushing or pulling arm or leg controls, and could frequently 
engage in postural activities, such as climbing, stooping, 
kneeling, crouching, and crawling. He listed diagnoses of 
osteoarthritis and chronic pain syndrome, but noted no 
neurological deficit. On April 28, 1994, Dr. Sandler, also 
apparently a physician for the state of New Jersey, 
concurred in Dr. Atienza's assessment. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
In January 1992, Burnett filed for Social Security 
disability benefits, asserting her knee and spine injuries 
and back pain rendered her unable to work since May 18, 
1991, at which time she was 56 years old. According to 
Burnett's hand-written vocational report, her job at the 
supermarket was as a "deli clerk." She claimed her job 
required her to walk and stand 8 hours out of an 8 hour 
day, lift a maximum of 50 pounds at a time, frequently lift 
25 pounds, constantly bend, cut and wrap cheese, and use 
a slicer to clean cheese. The Social Security interviewer who 
took Burnett's application stated Burnett had difficulty 
sitting, had to stand periodically during the interview, and 
complained of back pain. Burnett's claim was denied in 
May 1992. She missed the appeal time. 
 
Burnett re-filed an application in November 1993, 
asserting that her knee and back pain had worsened. 
Burnett's disability report stated she was in constant pain 
from her leg and spine and that she could neither sit nor 
stand for too long. Her vocational report again indicated she 
formerly worked at a supermarket as a "deli clerk," and also 
that she had worked in the meat department, weighing, 
wrapping, and lifting trays of meat. Also, the SSA claims 
interviewer again stated Burnett had difficulty with sitting 
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and also with walking, noting that she had to stand several 
times during the interview and that she walked with a limp. 
 
After her application was again denied, Burnett requested 
a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on February 1, 
1995. Burnett testified her job involved being on her feet all 
day, lifting 50 pound cases of cheese from trucks onto 
dollies, wheeling them to her department, unloading the 
cases, cutting cheese, and bending. She maintained she 
has constant and persistent pain in her knee and lower 
back. Burnett has never been hospitalized or sought 
emergency care for this condition. She also testified she 
takes several different pain medications which help 
somewhat and do not cause any side effects. Burnett also 
treats her pain with warm soaks and a heating pad. She 
uses a "donut" to sit to alleviate the pain and numbness in 
her back. She cannot stand and walk for more than thirty 
minutes before her leg gets numb and she has to sit, and 
she cannot sit for more than twenty or thirty minutes 
before her spine hurts or her tailbone gets numb and she 
has to stand. She also claims she cannot sleep for more 
than four hours per night due to the pain. She can only do 
light shopping and household chores and cannot bend 
without pain. She goes grocery shopping but can only lift a 
five pound bag. According to Burnett, she is in constant 
pain, which is worsened by physical activity, and she 
cannot engage in social activities or work. 
 
Burnett's husband, George Burnett, submitted a letter to 
the ALJ attesting that, since her fall, Burnett can neither 
stand nor sit for any length of time without substantial 
pain, that she has chronic trouble sleeping, and that she is 
dependent on pain pills. Burnett's neighbor, Earl Sherman, 
also testified at the hearing and confirmed Burnett's pain 
and difficulty standing, walking, and sitting. 
 
The ALJ denied Burnett's claim on August 17, 1995 in a 
written opinion. R. 10-18. He first concluded Burnett had 
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 18, 
1991, the alleged date of the onset of her disability. He next 
found that, since that time, Burnett has been suffering 
from "a severe musculoskeletal impairment." R. 15. 
However, the ALJ concluded Burnett's impairment failed to 
meet or equal the level of severity of any of the listed 
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disabling conditions set forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P of 
Social Security Regulations No. 4. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 
Subpart P, App. 1 (1999). Finally, he determined Burnett 
"retained the residual functional capacity to perform her 
past relevant work as a delicatessen clerk, an occupation 
requiring light exertional demands." R. 18. Therefore, the 
ALJ concluded Burnett was not disabled. 
 
Burnett requested review of the ALJ's decision by the 
Appeals Council, asserting the decision was not supported 
by substantial evidence. In March 1996, the Appeals 
Council denied her request for review, rendering the ALJ's 
decision the final decision of the Commissioner for 
purposes of judicial review. Having exhausted her 
administrative remedies, in April 1996, Burnett sought 
review of the Commissioner's final decision in U.S. District 
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 405(g). The District Court 
affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits and 
dismissed Burnett's case in August 1999. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
We review the ALJ's decision under the same standard of 
review as the District Court, to determine whether there is 
substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ's 
decision. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 
422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 
43, 46 (3d Cir.1994)). Substantial evidence has been 
defined as "more than a mere scintilla"; it means "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
In order to establish a disability under the Social Security 
Act, Burnett must demonstrate some " `medically 
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him 
from engaging in any "substantial gainful activity" for a 
statutory twelve-month period.' " Plummer , 186 F.3d at 427 
(quoting Stunkard v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir.1988)); see also 42 U.S.C. 
S 423(d)(1). Burnett is considered unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity " `only if[her] physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of such severity that[s]he 
 
                                7 
  
is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, 
considering [her] age, education, and work experience, 
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 
exists in the national economy.' " Id. at 427-28 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. S 423(d)(2)(A)). 
 
In Plummer, we recounted the five step sequential 
evaluation for determining whether a claimant is under a 
disability, as set forth in 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520: 
 
        In step one, the Commissioner must determine 
       whether the claimant is currently engaging in 
       substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. S 1520(a). If a 
       claimant is found to be engaged in substantial activity, 
       the disability claim will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 
       482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-91, 96 
       L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). In step two, the Commissioner 
       must determine whether the claimant is suffering from 
       a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(c). If the 
       claimant fails to show that her impairments are 
       "severe", she is ineligible for disability benefits. 
 
        In step three, the Commissioner compares the 
       medical evidence of the claimant's impairment to a list 
       of impairments presumed severe enough to preclude 
       any gainful work. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(d). If a claimant 
       does not suffer from a listed impairment or its 
       equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four andfive. 
       Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether the 
       claimant retains the residual functional capacity to 
       perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 
       S 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of 
       demonstrating an inability to return to her past 
       relevant work. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d 
       Cir. 1994). 
 
        If the claimant is unable to resume her former 
       occupation, the evaluation moves to the final step. At 
       this stage, the burden of production shifts to the 
       Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is 
       capable of performing other available work in order to 
       deny a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(f). The 
       ALJ must show there are other jobs existing in 
       significant numbers in the national economy which the 
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       claimant can perform, consistent with her medical 
       impairments, age, education, past work experience, 
       and residual functional capacity. The ALJ must analyze 
       the cumulative effect of all the claimant's impairments 
       in determining whether she is capable of performing 
       work and is not disabled. 
 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. 
 
In this case, the ALJ addressed the first four steps and 
found: (1) Burnett has not engaged in substantial gainful 
activity since May 18, 1991; (2) Burnett is severely 
impaired, that is, she suffers from a "severe 
musculoskeletal impairment"; (3) Burnett's impairment 
does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment; 
and (4) Burnett has the residual functional capacity to 
enable her to perform her past relevant work as a 
"delicatessen clerk." R. 17-18. Accordingly, the ALJ 
concluded that Burnett is not disabled for purposes of 
Social Security disability benefits. The ALJ did not reach 
step five of the analysis. 
 
On appeal, Burnett first contends the ALJ erred in step 
three by finding her impairment did not meet or equal a 
listed impairment. Second, Burnett argues the ALJ erred in 
step four by finding she had the residual functional 
capacity to enable her to perform her past relevant work. 
Finally, Burnett asserts remand for a step five analysis is 
unnecessary because the record is clear she cannot 
perform any work in the national economy. Therefore, she 
maintains, we should vacate and remand with a directive to 
award benefits. 
 
A. Step Three: Whether Burnett's Impairment Matches 
       or is Equivalent to a Listed Impairment 
 
In step three, the ALJ must determine whether Burnett's 
impairment matches, or is equivalent to, one of the listed 
impairments. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. If the 
impairment is equivalent to a listed impairment, then 
Burnett is per se disabled and no further analysis is 
necessary. See id. The ALJ's step three analysis states in its 
entirety: 
 
       Although [Burnett] has established that she suffers 
       from a severe musculoskeletal [impairment], said 
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       impairment failed to equal the level of severity of any 
       disabling condition contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P 
       of Social Security Regulations No. 4. 
 
R. 16. 
 
Burnett first contends ALJ erred by making only a 
conclusory statement without mentioning any specific listed 
impairments or explaining his reasoning. Second, Burnett 
asserts the ALJ erred because there was not substantial 
evidence to conclude her knee and back impairments were 
not equivalent to impairments listed in sections 1.03 and 
1.05C of the listed impairments. Third, Burnett asserts the 
ALJ erred by not considering the combined effects of her 
impairments in determining whether they were equivalent 
to a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(a) (stating 
that, if there is more than one impairment, the SSA will 
consider whether the combination of impairments are 
equivalent to any listed impairment). 
 
As to Burnett's first contention, this Court requires the 
ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision. See Cotter v. 
Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1981). In Clifton v. 
Chater, 79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals set aside an ALJ's determination because 
the ALJ "merely stated a summary conclusion that 
appellant's impairments did not meet or equal any Listed 
Impairment," without identifying the relevant listed 
impairments, discussing the evidence, or explaining his 
reasoning. Id. at 1009. The Court concluded"[s]uch a bare 
conclusion is beyond meaningful judicial review." Id. But 
see Senne v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting claimant's argument that the conclusory form of 
the ALJ's decision alone justified remand, but remanding 
nonetheless because the court could not conclude the ALJ's 
step three finding was supported by substantial evidence). 
We agree with Burnett the ALJ's conclusory statement in 
this case is similarly beyond meaningful judicial review. Cf. 
Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming 
where ALJ gave reasons for determining claimant's 
impairment was not equivalent to a listed impairment cited 
by medical witness at hearing). Because we have no way to 
review the ALJ's hopelessly inadequate step three ruling, we 
will vacate and remand the case for a discussion of the 
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evidence and an explanation of reasoning supporting a 
determination that Burnett's "severe" impairment does not 
meet or is not equivalent to a listed impairment. 2 On 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At the hearing in front of the ALJ, Burnett's counsel did not identify 
or raise the two listed impairments which he now argues are pertinent. 
On appeal, the Commissioner does not assert that Burnett or her 
counsel were required to do so. While the burden is on the claimant to 
present medical findings that show his or her impairment matches a 
listing or is equal in severity to a listed impairment, see Williams v. 
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992), it is unclear from the 
regulations or caselaw whether a claimant must identify the relevant 
listing(s). The applicable regulations indicate that it is within the 
realm 
of the ALJ's expertise to determine the closest applicable listed 
impairment, based on the medical evidence, when examining whether a 
claimant's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment: 
 
       (a) How a medical equivalence is determined. We will decide that 
       your impairment(s) is medically equivalent to a listed impairment 
in 
       appendix 1 if the medical findings are at least equal in severity 
and 
       duration to the listed findings. We will compare the symptoms, 
       signs, and laboratory findings about your impairment(s), as shown 
       in the medical evidence we have about your claim, with the medical 
       criteria shown with the listed impairment. If your impairment is 
not 
       listed, we will consider the listed impairment most like your 
       impairment to decide whether your impairment is medically equal. 
       If you have more than one impairment, and none of them meets or 
       equals a listed impairment, we will review the symptoms, signs, and 
       laboratory findings about your impairment to determine whether the 
       combination of your impairments is medically equal to any listed 
       impairment. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1526 (1999). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d at 1009 
(noting, in reversing ALJ determination that claimant was not disabled 
at step three, that ALJ did not "even identify the relevant Listing or 
Listings"). Putting the responsibility on the ALJ to identify the relevant 
listed impairment(s) is consistent with the nature of Social Security 
disability proceedings which are "inquisitorial rather than adversarial" 
and in which "[i]t is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop 
the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Sims v. Apfel, No. 
98-9537, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3766, at *15 (June 5, 2000) 
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, 91 
S.Ct. 1420 (1971)). Such reasoning is further supported by the fact "that 
a large portion of Social Security [disability benefits] claimants either 
have no representation at all or are represented by non-attorneys." Id. at 
*17 (citation omitted). 
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remand, the ALJ shall fully develop the record and explain 
his findings at step three, including an analysis of whether 
and why Burnett's back and knee impairments, or those 
impairments combined, are or are not equivalent in severity 
to one of the listed impairments. 
 
B. Step Four: Whether Burnett's Residual Functional 
       Capacity Enables Her to Perform Past Relevant 
       Work 
 
In step four, the ALJ must determine whether a 
claimant's residual functional capacity enables her to 
perform her past relevant work. This step involves three 
substeps: (1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as 
to the claimant's residual functional capacity; (2) the ALJ 
must make findings of the physical and mental demands of 
the claimant's past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must 
compare the residual functional capacity to the past 
relevant work to determine whether claimant has the level 
of capability needed to perform the past relevant work. See 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1561; S.S.R. 82-62; Winfrey v. Chater, 92 
F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). Both residual functional 
capacity and past relevant work may be classified as either 
"sedentary," "light," "medium,""heavy," or "very heavy." See 
Adorno, 40 F.3d at 47; 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567. 
 
The ALJ first determined Burnett had a residual 
functional capacity to perform "light" work. R. 16-17. 
Second, the ALJ found her past relevant work was as a 
delicatessen clerk and consisted of "light" work. Id. Finally, 
the ALJ concluded that she had the residual functional 
capacity to perform her past relevant work as a delicatessen 
clerk. Id. Burnett contends the ALJ erred in determining 
both her residual functional capacity and her past relevant 
work. We agree. 
 
1. The Residual Functional Capacity Determination 
 
" `Residual functional capacity' is defined as that which 
an individual is still able to do despite the limitations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Because the ALJ concluded that Burnett had a "severe 
musculoskeletal impairment," it follows that, on remand, the analysis of 
the listed impairments should focus on those listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 
Subpt. P. App. 1, Pt. A S 1.00 (Musculoskeletal System). 
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caused by his or her impairment(s)." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 
F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1545(a)). The ALJ determined Burnett had the 
residual functional capacity to perform "light" work, which: 
 
       involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 
       frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 
       pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very 
       little, a job is in this category when it requires a good 
       deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting 
       most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm 
       or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing 
       a full or wide range of light work, you must have the 
       ability to do substantially all of these activities. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(b). Burnett contends the ALJ's 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence because: 
(i) the ALJ failed to consider all of the evidence before him; 
(ii) the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of her 
two impairments; and (iii) the evidence does not support a 
finding she can perform "light" work. 
 
The ALJ did err by reason of his failure to consider and 
explain his reasons for discounting all of the pertinent 
evidence before him in making his residual functional 
capacity determination. In making a residual functional 
capacity determination, the ALJ must consider all evidence 
before him. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429; Doak v. Heckler, 
790 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1986). Although the ALJ may 
weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must give some 
indication of the evidence which he rejects and his 
reason(s) for discounting such evidence. See Plummer, 186 
F.3d at 429; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. "In the absence of 
such an indication, the reviewing court cannot tell if 
significant probative evidence was not credited or simply 
ignored." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. 
 
In Adorno, this Court set aside an ALJ determination for 
failure to mention and refute some of the contradictory 
medical evidence before him. See 40 F.3d at 48. Similarly, 
the ALJ in this case failed to mention or refute some of the 
contradictory medical evidence before him. The ALJ 
discussed the following objective medical evidence in his 
determination: 
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       - Dr. Surgent's diagnosis of chondromalacia in the 
       knee with minor swelling and muscle weakness; 
 
       - MRI scan of lower back showing mild disc bulge 
       without stenosis; 
 
       - X-rays showing slight narrowing of the lateral 
       compartment of the knee; 
 
       - The physical therapist's report of good strength and 
       range of motion in knee; 
 
       - Dr. Mittman's report of no tenderness or instability 
       in knee and his releasing her to return to work; 
 
       - Dr. Hess's report finding no objective orthopaedic 
       defects, normal range of motion in back and knee, 
       no muscle spasm, negative straight leg raising test, 
       normal neurological responses, and ability to lift 20 
       pounds and sit and stand throughout workday; 
 
       - Dr. Knapp's diagnosis of knee sprain, lumbar 
       sprain, and lumbar myositis and his findings of 
       good knee stability, no atrophy in knee, ability to 
       perform heel to toe walking, no crepitus, nearly 
       normal range of motion in spine, and muscle spasm 
       in back; 
 
       - Dr. Berkowitz's prescription of non-steroidal anti- 
       inflammatory medication and physical therapy; 
 
       - the side effects of her medication.3 
 
However, the ALJ failed to mention some contradictory, 
objective medical evidence, including: 
 
       - Dr. Makowski's diagnosis, via MRI scan performed 
       by Dr. Vitale, of first degree spondylolisthesis in her 
       lower back; 
 
       - Dr. Atienza's diagnoses of osteoarthritis and chronic 
       pain syndrome and Dr. Sandler's concurrence in 
       these diagnoses; 
 
       - MRI of knee showing joint effusion; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This finding is required by Stewart v. Secretary of HEW, 714 F.2d 287, 
290 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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       - Dr. Surgent's report that Burnett still has grating 
       sensation in the knee and has reached a plateau 
       with regards to further treatment; 
 
       - Dr. Knapp's report of a loss of 10 degree range of 
       motion in spine and that she is 30% permanently 
       and totally disabled with no prognosis of 
       improvement; 
 
       - Dr. Berkowitz's report of a mild limp, tenderness 
       over sacrum and coccyx, and diagnosis of 
       hyperlordosis; 
 
       - Dr. Hess' assessment that Burnett could sit and 
       stand only "intermittently." 
 
The ALJ's failure to mention and explain this contradictory 
medical evidence was error. See Adorno, 40 F.3d at 48; 
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707. On remand, the ALJ must review 
all of the pertinent medical evidence, explaining his 
conciliations and rejections. 
 
Similar to the medical reports, the ALJ must also 
consider and weigh all of the non-medical evidence before 
him. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 
1983); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707. Although allegations of pain 
and other subjective symptoms must be consistent with 
objective medical evidence, see Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362 
(citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1529), the ALJ must still explain 
why he is rejecting the testimony. See Van Horn , 717 F.2d 
at 873. In Van Horn, this Court set aside an ALJ's finding 
because he failed to explain why he rejected certain non- 
medical testimony. See 717 F.2d at 873. In this case, the 
ALJ explained he rejected Burnett's testimony regarding the 
extent of her pain because he determined it was not 
supported by the objective medical evidence. However, the 
ALJ failed to mention the testimony of Burnett's husband, 
George Burnett, and her neighbor, Earl Sherman. On 
appeal, the Commissioner contends the ALJ did not need to 
mention their testimony because it "added nothing more 
than stating [Burnett's] testimony was truthful." 
Commissioner's Brief at 21. This argument lacks merit 
because the ALJ made a credibility determination regarding 
Burnett, and these witnesses were there to bolster her 
credibility. R. 17 ("claimant's allegations of disability made 
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at hearing are unsubstantiated"). In Van Horn , we stated we 
expect the ALJ to address the testimony of such additional 
witnesses. On remand, the ALJ must address the testimony 
of George Burnett and Earl Sherman. 
 
Next, Burnett contends the ALJ erred by failing to 
consider the combined effect of her knee and back 
impairments. Burnett is correct that the ALJ must consider 
the combined effect of multiple impairments, regardless of 
their severity. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1545. The ALJ's opinion 
indicates he did consider the combined effects of Burnett's 
impairments. However, because the ALJ failed to consider 
all pertinent evidence, that ruling is brought into question. 
On remand, the ALJ must properly consider the combined 
effects of Burnett's two impairments. 
 
Finally Burnett asserts the ALJ's finding that she can 
perform "light" work is not supported by substantial record 
evidence. Burnett claims she lacks the residual functional 
capacity to even perform "sedentary" work. 4 Because the 
ALJ erred in not evaluating all of the medical evidence, this 
Court cannot now assess whether the ALJ's determination 
that Burnett has the residual functional capacity to 
perform "light" work was supported by substantial 
evidence, let alone assess whether she lacks the residual 
functional capacity to even perform "sedentary" work. 
 
2. The Past Relevant Work Determination 
 
A determination of past relevant work is a determination 
of the "physical and mental demands of jobs a claimant has 
performed in the past." S.S.R. 82-62. The ALJ determined 
Burnett's past relevant work was as a "delicatessen clerk" 
which involved only "light" work. R. 16-17. Burnett 
challenges the ALJ's conclusion that her past relevant work 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. "Sedentary" work: 
 
       involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally 
       lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small 
tools. 
       Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, 
a 
       certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in 
       carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing 
       are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(a). 
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was "light" work as being unsupported by substantial 
evidence. We agree. 
 
S.S.R. 82-62 sets forth the evidence which should be 
considered in making a determination of a claimant's past 
relevant work: 
 
       The claimant is the primary source for vocational 
       documentation, and statements by the claimant 
       regarding past work are generally sufficient for 
       determining the skill level, exertional demands and 
       nonexertional demands of such work. Determination of 
       the claimant's ability to do [past relevant work] 
       requires a careful appraisal of (1) the individual's 
       statements as to which past work requirements can no 
       longer be met and the reason(s) for his or her inability 
       to meet those requirements; (2) medical evidence 
       establishing how the impairment limits ability to meet 
       the physical and mental requirements of the work; and 
       (3) in some cases, supplementary or corroborative 
       information from other sources such as employers, the 
       Dictionary of Occupational Titles, etc., on the 
       requirements of the work as generally performed in the 
       economy. 
 
S.S.R. 82-62 (emphasis added). The assessment of a 
claimant's past relevant work must be based on some 
evidence drawn from the above three categories listed in 
S.S.R. 82-62. See Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 584 
(3d Cir. 1986); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707. It is clear error to 
make a past relevant work determination that is contrary to 
uncontroverted evidence presented by the claimant. See id. 
 
In both Brewster and Cotter, the ALJ was presented with 
uncontroverted evidence from the claimant about the 
nature of the claimant's past relevant work. See id. The ALJ 
was not presented with and did not cite any contradictory 
evidence, such as a Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
("DOT") description of how the job is performed in the 
national economy. See id. In both cases, the ALJ rejected 
the claimant's testimony and found the past relevant work 
to be of a different nature. See id. In both cases, this Court 
reversed the ALJ's determination as being unsupported by 
substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ's 
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assessment was different from the claimant's 
uncontroverted testimony about the demands of his past 
relevant work. See id. 
 
In this case, the ALJ was presented with uncontroverted 
evidence submitted by Burnett. In her description of her 
past relevant work on her vocational report, Burnett 
indicated she was a "deli clerk," who walked and stood 8 
hours out of an 8 hour day, lifted a maximum of 50 pounds 
at a time, frequently lifted 25 pounds, constantly had to 
bend, cut and wrapped cheese, and used a slicer to clean 
cheese. In her testimony before the ALJ, she stated her past 
relevant work involved being on her feet all day, lifting 50 
pound cases of cheese from trucks onto dollies, cutting 
cheese, and bending. This uncontroverted evidence 
indicates her past relevant work involved "medium" work.5 
 
However, the ALJ rejected Burnett's testimony and found 
her past relevant work involved "light" work. R. 16, 18. The 
ALJ held Burnett's description of her past relevant work 
was "inconsistent with the way this occupation is 
customarily performed in the national economy." R. 16. 
Although the Commissioner argues this decision is 
supported by three pieces of evidence, this purported 
evidence does not contradict Burnett's vocational report 
and testimony. 
 
The ALJ cited as contradictory evidence, a purported 
definition of "delicatessen clerk" in the DOT, which 
allegedly states this job involves light work. R. 16. "The 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) descriptions can be 
relied upon -- for jobs that are listed in the DOT -- to define 
the job as it is usually performed in the national economy." 
S.S.R. 82-61 (emphasis added). In this case, the ALJ made 
up the occupational title of "delicatessen clerk." It is simply 
nowhere to be found in the DOT, nor did the ALJ give any 
reference to a particular DOT code. An illusory definition in 
the DOT cannot be relied upon and is not contradictory 
evidence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with 
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds." 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1567(c). 
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The Commissioner, recognizing the ALJ created a non- 
existent occupational title, attempts to substitute reliance 
on an alternative DOT job title and definition not relied 
upon by the ALJ, that of "Deli Cutter-Slicer," DOT 
S 316.684-014, which is rated as "light" work.6 However, on 
appeal the Commissioner cannot "recharacterize" the 
claimant's past relevant work "in an effort to make sense of 
the ALJ's decision." Adorno, 40 F.3d at 46-47. In Adorno, 
the claimant's undisputed testimony was that her former 
job was that of a machine operator, which exposed her to 
fumes and heavy dust and that her asthma precluded such 
exposure. On appeal, the agency argued that the claimant's 
past work was that of a cabinetmaker, which as described 
in the DOT did not expose the worker to dust and fumes. 
We declared that such an "attempt to redefine[the 
claimant's] former occupation" was unsupported by 
substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 47. Similarly in 
this case, the Commissioner's attempt to redefine Burnett's 
past occupation is unsupported by substantial evidence. 
 
Even if the Court did allow this recharacterization of 
Burnett's job on appeal, the DOT can only be used to 
supplement or corroborate evidence adduced from the 
claimant. See S.S.R. 82-62. The occupation of Deli Cutter- 
Slicer is different from the past relevant work described by 
Burnett in that a Deli Cutter-Slicer merely cuts and slices 
cheese and does not participate in the heavier work of 
unloading cases of cheese from trucks. See DOT S 316.684- 
014. In contrast, Burnett testified her past relevant work 
required her to lift heavy cases of cheese from trucks. Since 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. A Deli Cutter-Slicer: 
 
       Cuts delicatessen meats and cheeses, using slicing machine, knives, 
       or other cutters: Places meat or cheese on cutting board and cuts 
       slices to designated thickness, using knives or other hand cutters. 
       Positions and clamps meat or cheese on carriage of slicing machine. 
       Adjusts knob to set machine for desired thickness. Presses button 
       to start motor that moves carriage past rotary blade that slices 
       meats and cheeses. Stacks cut pieces on tray or platter, separating 
       portions with paper. May weigh and wrap sliced foods and affix 
       sticker showing price and weight. 
 
DOT S 316.684-014. 
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the DOT does not corroborate or supplement the 
uncontroverted description given by Burnett, and is not 
consistent with her description of her past relevant work, 
this definition cannot be used to cast doubt on Burnett's 
credibility as to her past relevant work.7  
 
Inexplicably, the ALJ refuted Burnett's contention that 
she lifted 50 pound boxes of cheese by observing she"is 
diminutive, weighing no more than 100 pounds," making it 
"unlikely" she would have been asked to lift 50 pounds on 
the job. R. 17. However, an ALJ may not make speculative 
conclusions without any supporting evidence, see Plummer, 
186 F.3d at 429, not to mention conclusions apparently 
based on gender stereotyping. In this case, there is 
absolutely no evidence, medical or otherwise, that a 5 foot 
tall, 100 pound woman would be unable to lift a 50 pound 
box. In making this conclusion, the ALJ went beyond the 
uncontradicted evidence in the case and committed error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. On appeal, Burnett asserts her past work was more akin to DOT 
S 299.367-014, Stock Clerk, which has alternate titles including 
Delicatessen-Goods Stock Clerk, and is defined as follows: 
 
       Inventories, stores, prices, and restocks merchandise displays in 
       retail store: Takes inventory or examines merchandise to identify 
       items to be reordered or replenished. Requisitions merchandise from 
       supplier based on available space, merchandise on hand, customer 
       demand, or advertised specials. Receives, opens, and unpacks 
       cartons or crates of merchandise, checking invoice against items 
       received. Stamps, attaches, or changes price tags on merchandise, 
       referring to price list. Stocks storage areas and displays with new 
or 
       transferred merchandise. Sets up advertising signs and displays 
       merchandise on shelves, counters, or tables to attract customers 
       and promote sales. Cleans display cases, shelves, and aisles. May 
       itemize and total customer merchandise selection at check out 
       counter, using cash register, and accept cash or charge card for 
       purchases. May pack customer purchases in bags or cartons. May 
       transport packages to specified vehicle for customer. 
 
DOT S 299.367-014. Although this position generally involves the 
unloading of merchandise and is designated as a medium to heavy 
occupation, it also involves other tasks related to inventory and pricing 
that, based on the current record, Burnett does not appear to have done 
in her past work. More likely, Burnett's past relevant work falls 
somewhere between a deli cutter-slicer and a deli stock clerk as defined 
in the DOT. 
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Finally, the Commissioner notes that Burnett did not 
raise a specific objection to the ALJ's conclusion that she 
worked as a delicatessen clerk in her request for review to 
the Appeals Council.8 The Commissioner asserts that, 
under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, a court 
should not consider an argument which has not been 
specifically raised in agency proceedings which preceded 
the appeal. Therefore, the Commissioner argues, Burnett 
may not raise this issue as grounds for appeal. We 
disagree. In Sims v. Apfel, supra note 2, the Supreme Court 
directly addressed this issue and held that Social Security 
disability "[c]laimants who exhaust administrative remedies 
need not also exhaust issues in a request for review by the 
Appeals Council in order to preserve judicial review of those 
issues." 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3766, at * 18. Therefore, Burnett 
is not precluded from raising this issue on appeal. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the ALJ's assessment 
of Burnett's past relevant work is not based on substantial 
evidence in the record. On remand, the ALJ should fully 
develop the record and make specific findings as to the 
physical and mental demands of Burnett's past relevant 
work. See SSR 82-62;9Winfrey, 90 F.3d at 1023. Absent 
additional evidence to the contrary, the ALJ must accept 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Parties make requests for review of a hearing decision to the Appeals 
Council using a standard form, HA-520-U5 (3-94). R. at 6. Item number 
5 of that form states "I request that the Appeals Council review the 
Administrative Law Judge's action on the above claim because:" and 
provides just three lines for the claimant to fill in the reason. Id. 
Burnett 
in her request asserted generally that the ALJ's decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
 
9. SSR 82-62 states: 
 
       Sufficient documentation will be obtained to support the decision. 
       . . . 
 
       Adequate documentation of past work includes factual information 
       about those work demands which have a bearing on medically 
       established limitations. Detailed information about strength, 
       endurance, manipulative ability, mental demands and other jobs 
       requirements must be obtained as appropriate. This information will 
       be derived from a detailed description of the work obtained from 
the 
       claimant, employer, or other informed source. . . . 
 
                                21 
  
Burnett's representations and enter a finding that Burnett's 
past relevant work involved "medium" work. 10 
 
C. Step Five: Whether Burnett Could Perform Other 
       Work in the Economy 
 
The final step is an analysis of whether Burnett, based 
on her age, experience, and education, can perform any 
other available work in the economy. See Plummer , 186 
F.3d at 428. Burnett contends this Court need not remand 
for a step five analysis because this determination involves 
simple application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines or 
"Grids," see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App.2, to 
determine that Burnett is disabled. More specifically, 
Burnett maintains that because of her advanced age, 56 
years old at the time of alleged onset of the disability in 
1991, her limited education, and lack of transferable skills, 
regardless of whether she is capable of performing"light" 
work as the ALJ determined, or "sedentary" work, the Grids 
dictate a finding of disability. Therefore, she asserts, a 
remand is unnecessary. We disagree. 
 
A step five analysis can be quite fact specific, involving 
more than simply applying the Grids, including, perhaps, 
testimony of a vocational expert. See, e.g., Plummer, 186 
F.3d at 431. Although Burnett's age and education level are 
undisputed, from the record we cannot be confident that 
Burnett possess no skills or is not semi-skilled with 
transferable skills. Therefore we must remand for further 
factual findings with regard to the level and transferability 
of Burnett's skills. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's dismissal 
of Burnett's claim will be VACATED, and the case 
REMANDED to the District Court with directions to remand 
to the Commissioner for additional proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Should the ALJ continue to find Burnett to have a residual 
functional capacity for "light" work and that Burnett's past relevant work 
was "medium," then the ALJ must enter a finding Burnett lacks the 
residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work. 
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On remand, the ALJ shall fully develop the record and 
explain his findings at step three, including an analysis of 
whether and why Burnett's combined impairments are or 
are not equivalent in severity to one of the listed 
impairments. If it is necessary to reach step four, in 
determining Burnett's residual functional capacity, the ALJ 
must make specific findings as to all of the pertinent 
medical evidence, reconciling conflicts and, if rejecting 
particular evidence, explaining why; must address the non- 
medical evidence of George Burnett and Earl Sherman; and 
must consider the combined effects of Burnett's two 
impairments in conjunction with any medical evidence 
previously not considered and not rejected on remand. 
Additionally, the ALJ should fully develop the record and 
make specific findings as to the physical and mental 
demands of Burnett's past relevant work. Finally, if it is 
necessary to reach step five, the ALJ is directed to make 
the requisite factual findings with regard to the level and 
transferability of Burnett's skills. 
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